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ABSTRACT: The belief that elections reduce rent seeking by
government ofﬁcials is widely held, likewise the belief that rent
seeking decreases as elections are less subject to corruption. In
this paper we develop and test a model in which these beliefs are
carefully examined. Our model indicates that, while elections
may provide a disincentive for rent seeking, this disincentive (1)
neednotactuallymaterialise, and(2), isnotnecessarilycorrelated
with the integrity of the electoral protocol. We next consider the
ability of village-level elections in rural China to reduce rent seek-
ing, and the extent to which this ability varies as the elections are
more or less corruptible. We ﬁnd that in practice, even elections
that appear quite corruptible provide a strong disincentive to rent
seeking. Moreover, our results indicate which types of electoral
reform lead to more effective popular oversight of leaders, and
which do not.
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The belief that elections reduce rent seeking by government ofﬁcials is widely held, like-
wise the belief that rent seeking decreases as elections are less subject to corruption.1
In this paper we develop and test a model in which to examine carefully these beliefs.
We ﬁnd that elections do in fact provide a disincentive for rent seeking, but that this
disincentive need not vary with the integrity of the electoral protocol. In practice, it
appears that a corruptible election is often as useful as an uncorruptible election.
Our theoretical analysis establishes that, while elections can reduce rent seeking by
government ofﬁcials, equilibria in which legitimate elections do not curtail rent seeking
are also possible. The theoretical analysis, however, sheds little light on whether equilibria
in which elections curtail rent seeking are more or less likely than equilibria in which they
do not. Still more surprising, the theoretical model indicates that, even in equilibria where
elections curtail rent seeking, marginal changes in the ”nuts and bolts” details of choosing
ofﬁceholders need not have any effect on equilibrium rent seeking by elected ofﬁcials.
That is, corruptible elections may be just as useful as uncorruptible elections.
To test the implications of this model we draw on data we collected describing the
political economy of a sample of rural Chinese villages. This sample constitutes a nearly
ideal statistical laboratory in which to investigate the consequences of marginal changes
in democratic procedures. The many small villages in rural China engage in many of the
same economic activities, and subsequent to governance reforms conducted in the late
1980’s, are similar in their form of government. Consequently, it is reasonable to look for
relationships between marginal changes in the democratic process and marginal changes
in economic outcomes. We pursue precisely this strategy.
Our empirical ﬁndings are also surprising. Despite features in the original reform with
the potential to condemn village democracy to irrelevance, village elections serve as a
powerful check on rent seeking by local leaders. Moreover, this incentive effect is robust
tothevariousunsavoryelectoralpracticescommonintheseelections. Indeed, weﬁndthat
variation in some of our measures of electoral protocol are not associated with measurably
large variation in the incentive effect provided by elections. Not only do elections provide
leaders with strong incentives to act in the interests of their constituents, but this feature
of elections is far from being a fragile one. It is robust to the awkward institutions of local
democracy in rural China, and to various changes in the election process which serve to
make the elections more or less corruptible. Even corruptible elections provide leaders
with strong incentives to act in the interests of their constituents.
1We are grateful to Ramon Myers, Kevin O’Brien, Scott Rozelle, and to seminar participants at Brown,
Queen’s, CIAR, and, at the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, for helpful
comments and discussions.
1In an era where the ability to create working democratic governments is an increasingly
important part of foreign policy, these results should be of considerable interest to policy
makers. We ﬁnd that even very poorly conducted elections can have large incentive
effects, and furthermore, that the beneﬁts from additional reforms to improve election
integrity may be small. Having said this, our ﬁndings allow us to rank the importance
of four possible election reforms. We ﬁnd the strongest evidence that restrictions on
proxy voting will improve the ability of electorates in rural China to oversee their lead-
ers. The evidence that reductions in government involvement in the nominating process
will improve the quality of government is almost equally strong. We ﬁnd no evidence
that switching from mobile to ﬁxed polling places or increasing opportunities to make
campaign speeches affects government behavior.
Finally, our results shed light on the process by which property rights in land are
formed in rural China. Our empirical analysis is concerned with the bureaucratic shifting
of land between “responsibility land”, a property rights regime in which a large share
of land rents remain with the villagers, and “contract land”, a property rights regime
in which a larger share of land rents go to the village government. Our ﬁnding is that
village elections lead to a link between increases in the share of village land that is held as
responsibility land and electoral success.
2. Elections and Rent Seeking in Rural China
We assess the ability of elections in rural China to curtail rent seeking by village leaders,
and the extent to which this ability varies with the details of election protocol. To begin,
we describe the operation of rural governments and the conduct of elections. In order to
deduce a measure of government rent seeking, we also describe the nature of property
rights in agricultural land.
A. Village Governance
The two principle ﬁgures in most rural Chinese villages are the “village leader or
head"(cunzhang) and the “party secretary"(shuji). Since the late 1980’s, the village leader
is almost always an elected ofﬁcial. The party secretary, however, is typically either ap-
pointed by the township government or selected by the village party "cell". In addition to
these two ofﬁcials, the village government typically includes several subordinate elected
ofﬁcials.
However elected, the village leader shares power with the appointed party secretary,
although it is not clear how the responsibilities of the two ofﬁcials are delineated. The
reform that required the election of Village Leaders, The Village Organic Law, appears
2to be deliberately vague on this matter. It speciﬁes certain speciﬁc responsibilities for
the village leader, while leaving the Party Secretary in charge of “core leadership” (Bern-
stein and Guo (2002)), a mandate vague enough to subsume all or none of the leader’s
responsibilities. Anecdotal evidence indicates that there is considerable variation in the
actual division of authority. In response to the question “Who is in charge of this village?”
villagers often name the leader and often the secretary (and often some other person in
the village who is not currently an ofﬁceholder, such as a former party secretary).2 Not
surprisingly, Bernstein and Guo (2002) document several cases where this arrangement
leads to conﬂict between the two ofﬁceholders.
B. Elections
Starting in the late 1980’s villages in rural China were required by the Village Organic Law
to hold an election every three years for a village leader and a village council (Pastor and
Tan (2000)). Our data provide a history of village leadership and electoral turnover for 60
rural villages. These data were collected as a retrospective history from a current or (in a
few cases) an ex ofﬁcio village ofﬁcial. Altogether, we have information about 139 village
leaders and 129 party secretaries. We describe our data in more detail below. An appendix
describes our data on leader turnover exhaustively.
For all 60 of our villages we record the date of the most recent election. All 60 villages
report an election during the ﬁve years 1996-2000, of which all but 6 report an election
during the three years preceding the survey (1998-2000). Of these 60, we observe 28
villages where the incumbent survives this election. In the remaining 32 villages, we
observe that the village leader changes in the election year. For these villages our data
do not distinguish between villages where incumbents declined to run for re-election, and
villages where they ran for re-election and were defeated. We note, that for our purposes,
the distinction does not appear to be an important one: If we regard the decision to run
for re-election as an endogenous one, any leader who runs for re-election and loses should
be regarded as having made a mistake. Finally, in 3 of the 32 villages, the incumbent
village leader was promoted to party secretary at the time of the most recent election. Our
presumption is that these leaders did not run for re-election, and we exclude their villages
from our sample. This leaves us with a sample of 57 villages.
Our data indicate that 49% of incumbents survived the most recent elections. Table
1 shows that these survival rates also decrease with time. This is consistent with our
observation that term length is decreasing with time.3 Not surprisingly, we also observe
2Scott Rozelle: personal communication 2002.
3For those villages where we observe two completed spells in ofﬁce, the average second term is shorter
than the average ﬁrst term.
3TABLE 1 
ELECTION COUNT AND SURVIVORSHIP BY YEAR AND PROVINCE 
Year of Most Recent Election 
Province  1996 1997 1998  1999  2000 Total 
          
          
Hebei 0  0  0 1
1 9 10 
       0.00
2 0.33 0.3 
Shaanxi  0 1 2  5  1 9 
   0.00  0.00  0.20  0.00  0.11 
Liaoning  1 3 5  0  0 9 
 1.00  0.67  0.60      0.67 
Zhejiang  0 0 7  3  0 10 
    0.57  0.33   0.50 
Sichuan  0 2 7  1  0 10 
   1.00  0.86  0.00    0.80 
Hubei 0 1 1  7  0 9 
   1.00  1.00  0.43    0.55 
Totals 1 2 22  17 10  57 
  1.00 0.71 0.64  0.29  0.30 0.49 
Notes: 1. # of villages reporting election in that year; 2. Share of incumbents returned to office. 
4considerable heterogeneity in survival rates across provinces, from only 10% in Shaanxi,
to 80% in Sichuan.
Our data also record the number of elections conducted in each village between the
survey date in late fall 2000 and the 1988 inception of the Organic Law. The number of
elections held in this period ranges between 1 and 6, with a mean of 3.4, and a median
of 4. Thus, while all of our villages hold elections, elections are a recent and evolving
phenomena.
As the ﬁrst glimmerings of democracy in China, village elections have been the subject
of much study, e.g., O’Brien and Li (2000), Pastor and Tan (2000), and Bernstein and Guo
(2002), Chen (1999), Dearlove (1995), Li (2002), Leung(1996), and a body of literature now
suggests two stylised facts about the implementation of electoral reforms and the nature
of village democracy. First, at least until recently, resistance to the Organic Village Law
by both village bureaucrats and their superiors was common and may still persist. This
resistance impedes the implementation of the democratic and electoral reforms stipulated
by the law in favor of a regime where bureaucrats are less subject to electoral oversight.
Second, elections are being held in most villages.
Our data are broadly consistent with ﬁndings in this literature. Table 1 shows dramat-
ically different rates of re-election success across provinces, consistent with differential
enforcement of election laws at the provincial level. We also ﬁnd that elections are widely
held and that they are associated with high rates of leader turnover.
C. Electoral Protocol and Electoral Success
We now turn our attention to the “nuts and bolts" details of how elections are conducted,
and to the relationship between these details and the likelihood of re-election. Several
papers have examined the conduct and outcomes of village elections, e.g., O’Brien and
Li(2000) and Pastor and Tan (2000). These papers ﬁnd that elections are often vulnerable
to corruption, if they are not actually corrupt.
Our analysis concentrates on four election protocols suggested to be important by our
experience in the ﬁeld or by other researchers. These four election protocols are:
Is voting carried out at a ﬁxed location? Ballots are sometimes collected with roving ballot
boxes that are carried from house to house on election day (Our survey, and, Pastor and
Tan (2000)). Roving boxes are, in principal, easier to stuff than a ballot box at a ﬁxed
polling place, and households may be intimidated more easily at home than at a ﬁxed
public polling place. When there is a ﬁxed polling place, voting typically occurs at the
headquarters of the village government. In a small percentage of cases, typically when
5village residents are widely dispersed, voting may occur at the ofﬁce of each of the village
small groups.4
Is the nomination of candidates purely popular? Our survey indicates that the process of
getting on the ballot is highly variable. In some villages, only individuals or groups of
individuals have the right to nominate candidates. In other cases, nominations are made
by either the small group (xiao zu) or by the village representative committee (cunmin
daibiao hui). In still other cases, other entities within the village such as the village party
cell or the village committee play an important role. Finally, in a handful of cases, the
township government plays a key role in the nomination process.
We originally divided the nomination process into four basic types, but subsequently
(based onpreliminary analysis)reduced ourmeasure ofthe nomination processto asingle
categorical variable that is coded 1 if the right to nominates candidates resides solely and
entirely with voters or groups of voters. The absence of such direct nominating rights may
restrict the slate of candidates available to the villagers, and it is easy to imagine that this
systematically biases election outcomes.
Is there a public candidate forum? Our survey indicates that in some villages candidates
have an opportunity to address the villagers, while in others, this opportunity is not
available. Pastor and Tan (2000) suggests that the ability to make campaign speeches is
important. In principal, such speeches increase the information available to the electorate
about the slate of candidates. This change in the electorate’s information could lead to
systematically different election results.
Is proxy voting by non-family members permitted? The franchise is given exclusively to
people registered as residents in the village, and extends to registered residents not
present in the village on election day. In all of our villages absent residents are allowed to
cast their votes by proxy. Our survey also indicates that in about one-third of our villages,
residents who are present in the village but unwilling to vote may have their votes cast
by proxy. Finally, experience in the ﬁeld suggests that proxy voting commonly allows a
single individual to vote for the entire household.
Our survey records that in some villages, only immediate family members and near
relatives may serve as a proxy, while in others non-family members may also do so. Our
measure of proxy voting is an indicator variable that takes the value one when only family
members may serve as a proxy, and zero when non-family members may serve as a proxy.
4Villages are typically divided into 6-8 small groups (xiao zu). In the pre-reform era, small groups were
the same as the production teams.
6TABLE 2 
ELECTION PROTOCOL AND SURVIVORSHIP 
Protocol  Number of Villages 
Reporting the 
Protocol /Number of 
Villages with Data 
Survival with 
Protocol
Survival
without 
Protocol
Pr (meanwith =meanw/o)
(Chi
2 test) 
% % 
Popular Nomination  31/59 51.6 39.2 0.343
Public Forum for 
Candidates
12/60 41.7  47.9 0.698
Fixed Ballot Box   24/56  45.8  43.8  0.877
Restrictions on proxy 
voting
18/51 22.2  63.6 0.005 
Clearly, as there are fewer restrictions on proxy voting the opportunities for corruption
increase.
Table 2 provides basic statistics about the relationship between election protocol and
electoral success. Column 1 reports the number of villages for which we have data on
each of the four election protocols, and the number in which we observe a particular
protocol. For example, of the 56 villages for which we have information on polling, 24
report that during the most recent election voting was conducted at a ﬁxed ballot box.
Column 2 gives the probability that a leader survived an election in villages with the
relevant protocol. Thus, among the 24 villages with a ﬁxed polling place, the survival
rate of leaders was 46%. Column 3 gives the probability that a leader survives in villages
without the relevant protocol.
The table shows that suspicious electoral practices are pervasive in our sample. Polling
is conducted at a ﬁxed polling place in only 24 of 56 villages. Candidates had an oppor-
tunity to address the voters in a public forum in only 12 of 60 villages. In almost half of
the villages, the right to nominate candidates does not reside entirely with voters. Finally,
restrictions on proxy voting by non-family members are present in only slightly more than
a third of the villages reporting.
When proxy voting is restricted to household members, the survival rate is only 22.2
percent, barely one third the survival rate when proxy voting is less restricted, and the
difference is highly statistically signiﬁcant. With popular nominations, survival is almost
7ﬁfty percent higher than without (51.6% versus 35.5%), although the difference is not
statistically signiﬁcant. For the other two protocol variables, the differences in survival
rates are negligible and statistically insigniﬁcant. Therefore, of the four protocol variables
under consideration, the sample means presented in Table 2 suggest that only variation in
proxy voting and, possibly, variation in nominating procedures impact election outcomes.
D. Property Rights in Rural China and a Measure of Rent Seeking
In rural China, most agricultural land is in one of two property rights regimes, “respons-
ibility land”(ziren tian) and “contract land”(chengbao tian).5 In our sample, responsibility
land accounts for about 73% of the land in any given village, while contract land rep-
resents 13%.6 The remaining fraction is divided among two other small property rights
regimes with which we will not be concerned, private plots (ziliu di), which are a legacy of
the collective era, and reclaimed land (kaihuang di). With the exception of the private plots,
all land in the village is nominally the property of the village, and whether the villagers
who farm it enjoy the rights associated with responsibility or contract land is determined
by the village government.
By western standards, responsibility land is exotic. It is distributed to households on
the basis of household size, and possibly household labor supply. It is also subject to
periodic “village-wide reallocations" in which the village government conﬁscates a large
share of the stock of responsibility land from households and then reallocates the land to
existing and newly formed households. The village may also reassign responsibility land
to a different property rights regime.7 Village wide reallocations typically occur every 5 or
6 years, and sometimes less frequently. In addition to village-wide reallocations, smaller
reallocations of responsibility land are also common.
Responsibility land is subject to two types of “tax”. The ﬁrst is an agricultural quota
which requires the farmer to sell a certain amount of farm output, typically grain, to the
state at a below market price. It is often possible to fulﬁll a quota obligation with a cash
payment equal to the difference in the value of quota at market and procurement prices.8
The second type of tax is an agricultural tax, payable in grain or cash. Both of these taxes
are effectively paid to the central government.
5We include in responsibility land what is usually referred to as grain ration land (kouliang tian), which
is allocated to households to meet grain subsistence needs. The key difference between grain ration land
and responsibility land is that the former does not carry a quota. See Brandt et. al. (2002) for a discussion of
property rights’ regimes in rural China.
6Throughout our analysis, we restrict attention to cropland. While cropland accounts for the majority of
agricultural land, some agricultural land is devoted to orchards, greenhouses, and ﬁsh ponds.
7Whilethecentralgovernmentperiodicallyissuesdirectivesguaranteeingsecuretenureonresponsibility
land, these directives are systematically ignored, and reallocation of village land continues.
8In 2000, the implicit tax associated with the quota effectively turned into a subsidy as the market price
fell below the procurement price.
8Contractland, ontheother hand, isa propertyrights’regimethatis familiarinthe west.
A villager leases land from the village, for a mutually agreed upon price and duration.
Rent payments for contract land are made to the village government, and are the property
of the village government. Contract land is not generally subject to either the agricultural
quota or tax.
Two features of these two types of property rights are important for this analysis. First,
the village government is a party to every transaction involving responsibility or contract
land. Only the village government may reallocate responsibility land, and the village
government is a party to every transaction of contract land. Thus, institutional changes
that alter the incentives faced by local bureaucrats may change the distribution of land
across two types of property rights. Second, the villager occupying a plot of responsibility
land retains more of the land rent than if the land is contract land.9 To the extent that taxes
appropriate land rents, these rents go to the central government. Conversely, for contract
land more of the land rent is extracted for the village coffers, where it may provide beneﬁts
to local village ofﬁcials. 10
It follows from this discussion that increases in the proportion of village land held
in responsibility land increase the share of land rents retained by villagers. Conversely,
decreases in responsibility land indicate that land rent is being reallocated and possibly
appropriated by the village government. An increase in the share of contract land, on
the other hand, is very clearly an increase in the amount of land rent appropriated by the
village government.11
In light of this, changes in the share of village land in contract and responsibility land
are indicators of changes in the rent seeking activity by the village government. Increases
in the share of contract land, or decreases in the share of responsibility land both indicate
increases in land rent appropriated by the government. Our presumption is that villagers
are harmed by these increased levels of rent extraction, and that leaders beneﬁt. In
particular, we suppose that leaders either appropriate fund for their own use, or that they
prefer to administer governments with larger budgets: Both are probable. Leaders may
also derive some beneﬁt by renting contract land to friends and family. Figure 1 presents
histograms of election year changes in shares of contract and responsibility land for our
9We deﬁne the land rent to be equal to the net income from farming the land, less the opportunity cost
of the household’s labor.
10Since a village’s agricultural tax burden is ﬁxed, as the amount of responsibility land decreases, the tax
rate per unit of responsibility land increases. Thus, not only do reductions in responsibility land serve to
reallocate land rents, but they also reallocate the tax burden. This too, could lead villagers to ﬁnd decreases
in responsibility land distasteful.
11During our survey pre-tests, we encountered a village where the village leader appropriated all of the
responsibility land and converted it to contract land, using land rents purely for his own beneﬁts. Residents
ofthisvillageweredisappointedtolearnthatwewerenotreporterstheretoexposethescandal. Thisvillage,
however, is not among those sampled in the actual survey.
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Figure 1. The figure on the left gives a histogram of changes in the share
responsibility land in the year prior to the most recent election. The figure
on the right presents the corresponding histogram for changes in the share of
contract land.
sample.
As described above, changes in contract land and changes in changes in responsibility
land are nearly equivalent as measures of government rent seeking. In fact, there are two
importantdifferences. First, contractlandaccountsforarelativelysmallshareoftotalland
and is often concentrated in the hands of a few households. Since our survey involves
about 5% of households in each village, it often happens that we do not interview a single
household with contract land. Thus our measure of changes in contract land is a noisy
one. Since responsibility land is widely held this problem does not arise for responsibility
land. Thus, our measure of changes in the share of contract land is probably noisier
than is our measure of changes in the share of responsibility land. Second, a reduction
in responsibility also occurs if the village sells some of its land for either residential or
commercial uses. Reportedly, these kinds of sales have been widely subject to ofﬁcial
corruption. (Contract land is less likely to be subject to such sales, precisely because it is
under contract.) In light of these differences between contract and responsibility land, our
analysis concentrates on changes in the share of responsibility land.
3. A Model of Electoral Defeat as Punishment and its Implications
We are interested in examining the ability of elections to reduce rent seeking by elected
ofﬁcials, and, the way that the inﬂuence of elections varies as elections are more or less
corruptible. In this section we develop a theoretical model in which to pursue these
inquiries. We have three objectives in developing this model. First, to provide a basis
for an empirical assessment of the ability of elections to punish rent seeking. Second, to
formalise what is meant by electoral corruptibility, and third, to provide a basis for tests
10to measure the impact of such corruptibility on the ability of elections to restrain rent
seeking.
Our model is driven by two stylised facts. First, voters can discipline leaders by
denying them ofﬁce in the future. Second, at some point, as leaders age, this threat loses
its effectiveness. We also suppose that candidates’ time preferences cannot be observed
prior to inauguration, although the equilibria we describe are robust to dropping this
assumption.
In our model, there exist equilibria in which leaders restrict current rent seeking in
exchange for the opportunity to return to ofﬁce and collect further rents. Thus, the extent
to which elections restrict rent seeking is limited by the willingness of leaders to accept
reductions in current rent in exchange for increases in future rent. The ability of elections
to limit rent seeking is also constrained by the ability of an electorate to replace leaders
conditional on any given level of rent seeking. This condition gives rise to a formalisation
of electoral corruptibility and suggests an empirical approach to the problem of assessing
the importance of electoral corruptibility.
There is a fairly extensive theoretical literature analysing electoral cycles in ﬁscal
policies (see Besley and Case (1995a) for a bibliography). In these models a politician has
private information about his ability, e.g., Rogoff (1990), or about his tastes, e.g., Besley
and Case (1995a) or Banks and Sundaram (1998). Electoral cycles in ﬁscal policies arise as
separating equilibria wherein leaders choose policies to signal their type to the electorate.
Our model ﬁnds that electoral cycles also emerge as a consequence of quite different
economic forces. We regard elections as a repeated game between a long lived electorate
and a series of short lived politicians. In this setting, electoral cycles can emerge, not as
a consequence of a signalling game, but as a consequence of trigger strategies employed
by the electorate and politicians. In the existing literature, it is natural to think of cycles
as a consequence of leaders’ efforts to establish a good reputation; in our model it is more
natural to think of cycles as emerging from the electorate’s efforts to preserve a good
reputation.
While our principal objective for the theoretical analysis is to motivate our econometric
investigations, given the high level of interest in electoral cycles in ﬁscal policy,12 our
model is of intrinsic interest since it suggests a new cause for such cycles. Further, our
model is much better suited to our data than are the extant signalling models. Signalling
models of electoral cycles are intended to represent large western democracies where the
electorate is likely to be poorly informed about a politician’s tastes and ability, and where
"rent seeking" activity involves the manipulation of ﬁscal policies to suit the tastes of the
12 For example, Besley and Case(1995a,b,2003), Persson and Tabelinni(2003), Petterson-Lidbom(2002)
11politician rather than the electorate.13 These models are not well suited to an analysis
of small rural villages where, since the electorate is personally acquainted with their
politicians, there can be much less uncertainty about their tastes and abilities, and where
rent seeking involves, not marginal changes in public policy, but outright conﬁscation of
property. This is precisely the environment that our model is intended to describe.
The second contribution of our theoretical analysis is to point out that "electoral cor-
ruptibility" can be formalised as a constraint on the electorate’s strategy set. The argument
for this formalisation applies equally well to signalling models of electoral cycles in ﬁscal
policy.
A. The Electoral Cycle as a Strategic Game
Begin with the following description of a village’s electoral history. Electoral reform
occurs at time t = 1 and a leader is drawn at random from the pool of candidates. This
leader then chooses an amount of rent to extract from the village. The electorate observes
this level of rent extraction and chooses to return the incumbent to ofﬁce for a second
term, or selects a new leader from the pool of candidates. In the second period, the leader
chooses an amount of rent to extract from the village, and the electorate again chooses a
voting strategy. This process repeats itself in subsequent periods.
This description of the electoral process makes clear that elections may discipline lead-
ers by denying them the rent associated with additional time in ofﬁce. If an electorate is
able to make an incumbent’s electoral success conditional on low levels of rent seeking
activity, then the incumbents will reduce rent seeking activity in order to increase their
chances of re-election. In what follows we restate our stylised description of the electoral
process as an extensive form game in order to examine the robustness of this intuition.
We imagine that there are two types of candidates for ofﬁce, “patient” and “impatient”.
Impatient leaders serve only one term, and therefore, do not care about payoffs in the
subsequent period. Patient leaders care about payoffs in both the current and subsequent
period. However, if patient leaders return to ofﬁce for a second term they return as
impatient leaders. New leaders are selected at random from the pool of candidates, and
the proportion of patient candidates in the pool of candidates is α ∈ [0,1]. Thus, patient
leaders replace outgoing incumbents with probability α.14
In each period the leader chooses an amount of rent to extract from the voter. Let
RL
t ∈

R,R

denote the amount of rent extracted in period t. These rents are imagined as
13Indeed, as the amount of private information decreases, electoral cycles must disappear from these
models.
14Since "patient" and "impatient" implicitly reﬂect a politician’s time until retirement, these terms are
near synonyms for “young" and “old". The difference is that, while age may be easily observed, time until
retirement date will often be private information that is related to age.
12beneﬁts that accrue to the ofﬁceholder strictly above the opportunity cost of his time. The
upper bound of this interval is the threshold at which rent seeking becomes criminal and
is restricted by legal rather than electoral sanctions. The lower bound is arbitrary. Let It
be an indicator variable which is one in each period when the incumbent in period t wins
re-election, and zero when a patient incumbent is defeated or an impatient incumbent
retires. An electoral history for the village is a sequence H = (RL
t ,It)∞
t=0 which records
rent extraction and electoral success for all time periods. Similarly, an electoral history of
the village at time T is a subsequence HT = (RL
t ,It)T
t=0.
A patient leader’s payoff is the sum of rent today and rent tomorrow, where rent
tomorrow is discounted by the leader’s subjective discount factor and by the probab-
ility of retaining ofﬁce. That is, preferences of a patient leader elected in period t are
U
 
RL
t ,RL
t+1

= RL
t + δPr(It = 1)RL
t+1. An impatient leader is concerned only about
payoffs in the current period, hence the payoffs of an impatient leader are U(Rt) = Rt.
Since patient leaders who return to ofﬁce for a second term, return as impatient leaders,
their payoffs in the second term are also U(Rt) = Rt.
There is a single inﬁnitely lived voter – “the electorate” – who decides whether or not
to choose a new leader in each period. The electorate’s payoff depends on the entire elect-
oral history, and is given by W(H) = −Σ∞
t=0γtRL
t , where γ is the electorate’s subjective
discount factor. That is, the electorate is better off as the discounted present value of rent
extracted by a sequence of leaders decreases.
Impatient leaders always choose R. Denote the action of a patient leader at t by RL
t .
After a patient incumbent chooses a level of rent extraction, the electorate chooses the
probability with which it re-elects the leader. We allow the electorate to make re-election
conditional on the observed level of rent seeking, but to simplify the analysis, restrict
attention to simple deterministic re-election functions, i.e.,
I(RL
t ,RE
t ) =
(
1 if RL
t ≤ RE
t
0 if RL
t > RE
t
. (1)
Given this restriction on the form of re-election functions, an action for the electorate in
each period is simply a choice of RE
t , the threshold level of rent extraction determining
whether or not an incumbent is returned to ofﬁce. The electorate chooses the re-election
threshold from

R,R

, the same set from which the leaders choose rent extraction. Thus,
the electorate’s strategy set is large enough that it can punish any feasible amount of rent
seeking with electoral defeat.
Let SE
t , SL
t denote a strategy for the electorate at time t and a strategy for a patient leader
elected at time t.15 A strategy SE
t for the electorate at time t is a choice of RE
t0 for each
15To lighten notation SL
t is a patient leader’s strategy at time t conditional on the leader attaining ofﬁce.
Looking at such conditional strategies relieves us of keeping track of a “null move" and payoff for these
leaders when they never attain ofﬁce.
13time period t0 ≥ t, for each possible electoral history at time t − 1, and for each possible
strategyproﬁleforthepatientleaders. Thus SE
t : (Ht−1,(SL
t0)∞
t0=t)) −→ (RE
t )∞
t=t0. Astrategy
for a patient leader elected at time t is a function which chooses RL
t for every possible
electoral history at time t − 1, and every possible strategy for the electorate and future
leaders. Thus SL
t : (Ht−1,SE
t ,(SL
t )∞
t=t+1) −→ [R,R]. A strategy proﬁle for the economy is
((SE
t )∞
t=0,(SL
t )∞
t=0).
A patient leader’s objective is to choose rent extraction to maximise his payoffs, taking
as given his village’s electoral history and the way that electoral success responds to rent
seeking. That is, a patient leader solves,
max
RL
t ∈[R,R]
Rt + δI(RL
t ,RE
t )R.
Therefore, a patient leader’s optimal rent extraction is
Rt =
(
RE
t if RE
t ≥ (1− δ)R
R if RE
t < (1− δ)R
.
In words, a patient leader will forgo rent extraction in the present period in order to retain
ofﬁce, but only up to the point where the forgone rent is offset by the present value of next
period’s expected rent.
We are now able to examine more carefully the intuition that the threat of electoral
defeat can cause leaders to reduce their rent seeking activity in exchange for more time
in ofﬁce. Let R∗ ∈ [(1 − δ)R,R). Suppose that all patient leaders choose to play R∗ in
their youth, and the electorate in each period promises to re-elect any leader who plays
RL ≤ R∗. Such strategies give rise to the “cooperative" outcome in which patient leaders
restrict their rent seeking in exchange for a second term in ofﬁce. The problem with these
strategies is that the electorate’s promise to re-elect patient leaders is not credible. If the
electorate returns a patient leader to ofﬁce, they are guaranteed an impatient leader who
engages in maximal rent seeking the next period. On the other hand, if they do not re-elect
the patient leader, then with probability α a patient leader takes ofﬁce and engages in low
levels of rent seeking. Thus, the electorate should never honor its promise to return a
patient leader to ofﬁce. This commitment problem is the principal obstacle to equilibria
where elections discourage rent seeking.
Solving this commitment problem requires that leaders and electorate condition their
actions on the history of play. The strategies which enforce the cooperative outcome as a
Nash equilibrium are described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 There exists a Nash equilibrium such that the electorate and patient leaders always
choose the action R∗, for any R∗ ∈ [(1− δ)R,R).
14Proof Say that a history Ht is cooperative for R∗ if for all t0 ≤ t, the electorate has re-
elected every leader who extracted no more rent than R∗. More formally, a history Ht is
cooperative for R∗ if It0 = 1 whenever RL
t0 ≤ R∗ for all for t0 ∈ {1,...,t}. The initial history,
H0, is assumed cooperative in R∗.
Let SE∗
t be the strategy where the electorate promises to return a leader to ofﬁce
whenever the leader chooses a low level of rent extraction and the electorate has never
broken this promise in the past. That is,
SE∗
t =
(
R∗ if RL
t ≤ R∗
R Otherwise.
(2)
Let SL∗
t denote the strategy where a patient leader chooses a low level of rent seeking at
all histories where leaders who selected this strategy have always been re-elected, and a
high level of rent seeking otherwise. That is,
SL∗
t =
(
R∗ if Ht−1 is cooperative for R∗
R Otherwise.
(3)
We suppose that the leaders and electorate follow these strategies and show that each is a
best response to the other at all nodes along the cooperative path.
Consider a patient leader elected at time t at a node where Ht−1 is cooperative for R∗.
At such a node, if the patient leader follows SL∗
t he gets payoff U(R∗,R) ≥ R. Deviating
to a higher level of rent extraction, RL
t > R∗, assures that the leader will not be re-elected,
and hence gets payoff U(RL
t ,0) = RL
t ≤ R. Deviating to a lower level of rent extraction
RL
t < (1 − δ)R guarantees a strictly smaller payoff in the patient leader’s ﬁrst term with
no increase in re-election probability. Therefore, if Ht−1 is cooperative for R∗, then SL∗
t is a
best response to SE∗
t .
Consider the electorate’s problem at time t at a node where Ht−1 is cooperative for R∗
and a leader chooses Rt
L ≤ R∗. If the electorate follows SE∗
t and returns the incumbent to
ofﬁce, then in period t +1 rent extraction will be R and in period t +2 there is probability
α of a patient leader who observes a history that is cooperative in R∗ and chooses a low
level of rent extraction. On the other hand, if the electorate deviates from SE∗
t and does not
return the incumbent to ofﬁce, then all subsequent patient leaders observe histories that
are not cooperative for R∗ and play R, making the electorate strictly worse off. It follows
that SL∗
t is a best response to SE∗
t .
Proposition 1 establishes that our intuition that leaders will refrain from rent seeking
in order to secure more time in ofﬁce is consistent with self-interested behavior. However,
achieving such an outcome requires that the players overcome the electorate’s commit-
ment problem. The solution to this commitment problem developed in Proposition 1 is a
15weak one: Nash equilibrium precludes the possibility that once off the equilibrium path
the electorate or the leaders change their strategies, even if it is in their interests to do
so. With this caveat in place, it seems reasonable to imagine a stylised agent intended
to represent an “electorate" that acts with the sort of limited ratiocination implied by the
Nash equilibrium. 16
There also exist equilibria of this game where the outcome is “non-cooperative", with
all leaders serving a single term and engaging in maximal rent seeking. For example,
the strategies where leaders choose R for all histories and the electorate chooses R for all
histories are a Nash equilibrium where RL
t = R in all periods.
These results reﬁne our intuition that elections can restrict rent seeking by elected
leaders: Such reductions in rent seeking are a possible, but not a necessary consequence
of elections. It is possible for elections to occur which allow the electorate substantial
discretion in its choice of leaders and, in equilibrium, these elections need not restrict
rent seeking by leaders at all. Furthermore, theses results suggest that elections will not
serve to drive rent seeking by leaders to zero. Elections restrict current rent seeking with
the credible promise of future rents. Thus, the basis of a democratic election’s ability to
reduce rent seeking is the presence of some residual positive rents to ofﬁce holding.
B. Corruptibility of Elections
Given two elections, we deﬁne one to be more corruptible than the other if, all else equal,
it allows a leader to engage in higher levels of rent seeking and still retain ofﬁce. More
formally, an election or an election protocol is more corruptible if, at any given level of
rent seeking, an electorate’s ability to replace a leader is more constrained. That is, an
election is more corruptible as the set of re-election functions available to the electorate
shrinks.
Until now we have permitted the electorate to choose re-election functions of the form,
I(RL
t ,RE
t ) =
(
1 if Rt ≤ RE
t
0 if Rt > RE
t
,
where RE
t is selected from a set

R,R

. If we continue to restrict attention to such de-
terministic re-election functions, our deﬁnition of electoral corruptibility suggests that we
regard elections which allow the electorate this choice of election functions as perfectly
uncorrupt. The election protocol which gives rise to this choice set for the electorate
16 It appears to be possible to achieve the cooperative outcome of Proposition 1 as a Bayesian perfect
equilibria. Such equilibria would entail a more credible solution to the electorate’s commitment problem
at the cost of strategies that require a more complicated response to the history of play. It is not obvious
such ratiocination is plausible for our stylised electorate. Moreover, such a theorem does not affect the basic
conclusion that we draw from Proposition 1: The cooperative outcome can be achieved provided agents
ﬁnd a way to overcome the electorate’s commitment problem.
16places no restrictions on the ability of the electorate to dismiss its leaders: The electorate’s
strategy set is large enough that it can punish any feasible amount of rent seeking with
electoral defeat.
To make the notion of a corruptible election precise for the case of deterministic re-
election functions, we deﬁne an election to be corruptible if for some RC > R, the
electorate is restricted to choose its strategy from
h
RC,R
i
. That is, a corruptible electoral
protocol is one where leaders who engage in sufﬁciently low levels of rent seeking cannot
be defeated in an election. This matches our intuition very closely. As RC increases, the
leader may engage in progressively higher levels of rent seeking without the possibility
of electoral defeat. This favors the incumbent leader’s welfare over that of the candidates
or the electorate.
While this is a "reduced form" description of electoral corruptibility, it seems an apt
description of our data. If an incumbent anticipates the opportunity to obtain an addi-
tional vote through corrupt electoral practices, then he can increase rent seeking by an
amount that alienates an additional vote without affecting the outcome of the election.
Equivalently, the minimum level of rent seeking associated with losing an election in-
creases marginally with the opportunity to stuff a single ballot. Thus more corruptible
elections are those where the leader has an opportunity to cast proxy votes for their
constituents, where leaders can stuff ballots in a mobile ballot box, or where leaders can
prevent competitors from communicating with the electorate.
Theabilitytocontrolthenominatingprocessalsoleadstoamorecorruptibleelection: A
leader who can choose an unattractive challenger can afford to alienate more voters. Thus
an election with a purely popular nominating process is a less corruptible one and leaders
in such villages should be less likely to survive elections. However, a purely popular
nominating process should also have a second effect. A less restrictive nominating process
should select leaders who are better, at least on the basis of observable characteristics.
These leaders will extract less rent from their constituents and be more likely to survive
an election. As we will see later, it is this second effect that appears to dominate in our
data: All else equal, leaders in villages with a purely public nominating process are more
likely to survive re-election.
An interesting implication of this deﬁnition of corruptibility is that corruptible election
protocols need not result in different outcomes than perfectly uncorrupt elections. If a
less corruptible election enables a rational electorate to dismiss a leader for a lower level
of rent seeking, the electorate may not take advantage of the improved electoral protocol:
Doing so may cause a leader to prefer a single term in ofﬁce with high rent seeking to two
terms in ofﬁce, the ﬁrst with low rent seeking.
The possibility that corruptible and uncorruptible elections result in identical behavior
can be seen clearly in the cooperative equilibrium described by Proposition 1. Along the
17equilibrium path the electorate always returns to ofﬁce any leader who extracts no more
rent than R∗, where R∗ > R. Corruptible elections do not affect this outcome, provided
RC < R∗. In such an equilibrium, the ability of the electorate to punish rent seeking is not
restricted by the corruptibility of the elections; rather, it is restricted by the willingness of
leaders to forgo current rent in exchange for future rent. This is determined by the time
preferences of leaders and by the upper bound on rent seeking R. This upper bound on
rent seeking is determined, outside electoral process, for example, by the efﬁcacy of the
legal system or the fear of insurrection.
Thus, the model suggests that two regimes are possible, one in which corruptibility
matters, and another in which it does not. If a village is in a non-cooperative equilibrium
or if the corruptibility of elections is not a binding constraint on electorate behavior, then
the degree of corruptibility is irrelevant to the observed outcome. On the other hand, if
the corruptibility of an election is binding on electorate behavior, then rent seeking will
increase as electoral protocols become more corruptible.
Knowing which of these two regimes prevails is of fundamental importance to policy
makers. In the ﬁrst regime, decreases in rent seeking by leaders cannot be achieved by
electoral reform. It can only be achieved by reforms which decrease the threshold at which
rent seeking becomes subject to legal sanctions. In the second regime, electoral reform can
have the expected effect and lead to lower levels of rent seeking by leaders. With this said,
theory tells us only that two regimes are possible, determining which regime prevails in
any particular case is an empirical question.
C. Econometric Model
The theoretical analysis is driven by a small number of parameters for each village i; the
upper and lower bounds of the electorate’s strategy set, Ri and Ri, the leader’s time pref-
erences, δi, and an implicit indicator variable for whether the leader is “patient" or “im-
patient". As a practical matter, we expect that these parameters will vary systematically
with observable features of villages and leaders. Thus, Ri = R(xi,µi) and Ri = R(xi,µi),
where xi and µi are village level variables related to the amount of land rent that may be
extracted from the village, with xi observed and µi not observed by the econometrician.
Similarly, δi = δ(zi), where zi are leader characteristics affecting his tastes.
R∗
i , the threshold amount of rent which divides re-election from defeat is a function of
the parameters Ri and δi. Thus, we have R∗
i = R∗(Ri,δi) = R∗(xi,zi,µi). Given this, by
inspection of Equation 3, we have the leader’s choices of rent seeking as
SL∗
i = SL∗(xi,zi,µi,ηi), (4)
where ηi is a random variable, observed only by the leader, describing the leader’s type,
e.g., patient or impatient. By inspection of Equation 2 we have the electorate’s equilibrium
18choice of threshold as a function of the leader’s choice of rent seeking, along with R∗
i , and
R. Thus we have,
SE∗
i = SE∗(xi,zi,µi,SL∗(xi,zi,µi,ηi)). (5)
This equation, together with Equation 1 gives rise to a re-election function for each village.
That is, a function which assigns a probability of re-election to each level of rent seeking.
If yi is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 when a leader is re-elected and zero
otherwise, then this re-election function may be written,
Pr(yi = 1|xi,zi,µi,SL∗(xi,zi,µi,ηi)) = F(B0 + B1xi + B2zi + B3SL∗(xi,zi,µi,ηi) + µi). (6)
The theoretical analysis imposes the strong simplifying assumption that F is a simple
step function. In the empirical analysis, we relax this assumption and estimate F non-
parametrically and as a standard Logit distribution.
The theoretical analysis suggests two possible ways to assess the importance of election
protocol. The ﬁrst is to look at the effect of the protocol variables on rent seeking, i.e., in
Equation 4. This approach is used in empirical studies of electoral cycles in ﬁscal policy;
Besley and Case (1995a), Petterson-Lidbom(2002), Torsten and Persson (2003). The second
way to assess the importance of election protocol is to look at the effect of election protocol
on re-election probabilities, i.e., in Equation 5.
In the absence of variation in whether or not villages hold elections, Equation 4 does
not give us any insight into the ability of elections to punish rent seeking. However, this
is precisely what is captured by the parameter B3 in Equation 6. All else equal, as the
magnitude of this parameter is larger re-election probabilities are more sensitive to rent
seeking activities. Equation 6 also affords an opportunity to assess the importance of
election protocol. If an election protocol is binding on the electorate’s strategy then the
re-election function should shift as we move from villages with the protocol, to villages
without it.
Econometric Issues
Estimating Equation 6 poses a difﬁcult econometric problem. Since unobserved village
variables, µi, occur in the expression for SL∗, our estimate for B3 will be biased. The
standard response to this problem is to ﬁnd a variable correlated with the endogenous
variable but not with the error term, and conduct IV estimations. Such an approach is not
possible in this case.
To see this, note that the only variable that occurs solely in SL∗ is ηi, however this vari-
ablereﬂectstheleader’sprivateinformationabouthistype. Thus, apersuasiveinstrument
would need to be one observed by the leader and the econometrician, but not the villagers.
More intuitively, we cannot use leader characteristics like age or education as instruments.
19If such variables affect leader tastes, then upon observing them, the electorate will adjust
its strategy accordingly, and the variable’s effect does not occur solely through its effect
on SL∗.
Having said this, it is pretty clear which way this endogeneity problem will bias our
estimate of B3. Since the differences in unobserved village characteristics cause extra
dispersion in SL∗, the magnitude of our estimate of B3 will be biased downward (in the
same way that measurement error attenuates coefﬁcient estimates). This intuition will be
borne out by our regression results.
A second potential problem is the endogeneity of the electoral protocol variables. A
particularly corrupt leader may be more likely to arrange for an election without a ﬁxed
polling place, while the electorate in such a village is likely to resist such an action
more actively or to monitor a roving polling box more closely. What we observe is the
equilibrium effect of these different processes. Having said this, there is some evidence
to suggest that the choice of electoral process is not entirely endogenous to the village.
The Organic Law places responsibility for monitoring elections with the Ministry of Civil
Affairs and the county and township governments (O’Brien and Li (2000)), which may
or may not be sensitive to lobbying by candidates and voters. Moreover, regressions to
predict the various processes using county indicators (our sample contains two villages
per county) gives R2 ’s of .7 and .8, which suggests that much of the variation in protocol
is explained by processes exogenous to the village. Finally, efforts to develop ﬁrst stage
regressions to predict election protocol using variables which reﬂect village endowments
and the difﬁculty of communication with government and press outside the village, met
with very poor success.
A third potential problem is error in measuring the election protocol variables. In
order to learn about election protocols, in each village, our survey teams interviewed
a village cadre (or ex ofﬁcio cadre) about how the last election was conducted.17 All of
our discussion so far is based on these cadre reports. As a check, our survey teams also
asked four villagers the same questions. Unsurprisingly, the four villagers did not always
give the same answers, and did not always agree with the cadre. This suggests that the
cadres and villagers are reporting election protocols with some error. Since the presence of
measurement error leads to attenuation bias, it is important for us to address this problem
if we are to conclude that certain protocol variables are not important.
To make our problem manageable we ﬁrst construct a variable which contains the
modal villager response to each of our protocol questions. For villages where we record
both modal villager and cadre responses to our protocol questions, these responses agree
about 80% of the time. If reporting errors are random, this is consistent with cadre and
17“Cadre" refers to any government ofﬁcial. In our case enumerators typically interviewed the village
leader, or cunzhang, and occasionally interviewed the party secretary.
20modal villager reporting correctly about 90% of the time.18 While we do measure election
protocol with some error, our measures appear to be quite accurate. 19
Our exposition concentrates on results based upon cadre responses to the protocol
questions. However, to assess the importance of errors in measuring protocols on our
results we duplicate these estimations using the modal villagers responses. Unless noted
otherwise, these results are qualitatively identical to those we report. In order to assess
the importance of attenuation bias we also experiment with a two stage procedure which
uses the modal villager’s response and a collection of village controls as an instrument for
the cadre’s response.
4. Data
Our data were collected as part of a major household and village-level survey conducted
during the fall of 2000.20 Altogether, we surveyed 1200 households in 60 villages in 30
counties in 6 provinces of China. The provinces are: Liaoning, Hebei, Shaanxi, Sichuan,
Hubei, and Zhejiang. The selection of counties and villages was based on a stratiﬁed
sample; the selection of households in each village was random. Enumerators also inter-
viewed one or more cadre in each village.
Our household and village-level data provide a rich and detailed description of village
economic and political life. Among other things, our data include: (1) the history of
leadershipturnoverineachvillage; (2)detailsaboutwhenandhowthemostrecentvillage
election was conducted; (3) recent changes in household and village land holdings; (4)
household and village demographics and labor supply behavior; and (5) a retrospective
history of leader characteristics.
While much of the survey was administered to all 20 households in each village, to
reduce the burden of the survey, only four village households were questioned on topic 2
above, while only leaders were asked about topic 5. Leaders were also interviewed on all
other topics.
18If each report the true protocol with probability p, then they will make identical reports with probability
p2 + (1− p)2 = .8. Solving gives p = 0.89
19There is one variable for which the villager and cadre reports are systematically different. The villagers
report only four villages with a public forum, and in all of these villages the incumbent did not survive the
election. The cadres however, report public candidate forums in 12 villages, in 5 of which the incumbent
survived (see Table 2). For this protocol we prefer the cadre responses. Cadres are more likely to have
attended a public candidate forum than an average villager, and we suspect that villagers are more likely to
attend such a forum if they are unhappy with the current government.
20These data were collected in collaboration with Nansheng Bai, Scott Rozelle, Linxiu Zhang, and the
Chinese Center for Agricultural Policy, Beijing.
21TABLE 3 
LEADER BEHAVIOR IN YEAR PRIOR TO AN ELECTION 
 Age  ' '  Responsibility Land  ' '  Contract 
Land
Share with 
Investment  in 
Schools
    Survivor  45.8
(6.3)
-0.006
(0.025)
0.003
(0.010)
0.67
   Non-Survivor  46.0 
(6.7)
-0.013
(0.032)
0.026
(0.084)
0.44
Notes: For year prior to and after an election, Col 1: Mean leader age at inauguration. Col. 2: Mean 
change in the share of cropland held as responsibility land. Col 3: Mean change in share of cropland 
held as contract land. Standard deviations are in parentheses, Col 4:  Share of villages with a capital 
investment in schools in the year before an election. 
5. Empirical Results
A. Rent Seeking Conditional on Election Outcomes
The theoretical model indicates that re-election probabilities should vary with the level of
rent seeking behavior. Table 3 takes a ﬁrst look at this hypothesis.
To measure rent seeking by leaders we use the change in the proportion of village land
that is held as contract or responsibility land from one year to the next. In accordance
with our earlier argument, we suppose that villages experiencing increases in the share of
contract land or decreases in the share of responsibility land are villages where the leader
has increased rent seeking activity.
Table 3 presents the mean values of election year rent seeking by leaders who sub-
sequently survived the election to serve another term, and those who did not. For com-
pleteness, Column 1 gives mean age for each class of leaders. Columns two and three
of Table 3 present mean annual changes in the share of village land in responsibility and
contract land (and the corresponding standard errors). On average, losers decreased the
share of responsibility land by 0.017 in the year prior to an election, while an average
winner allowed the share of responsibility land to decrease by only 0.006. Similarly, an
average loser increased the share of contract land by 0.019 while the average winner
increased it by only 0.003. Thus, rent seeking in the year prior to an election is associated
with electoral defeat, in accord with the predictions of our model. Column four of Table
3 gives the share of villages where the government undertook a capital expenditure on
schools in the pre-election year. We see that 2/3 of successful incumbents made such
22Change Resp. Land
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Figure 2. Kernel estimate of the probability of electoral success conditional on
changes in the share of responsibility land.
investments, compared with fewer than 1/2 of unsuccessful incumbents.21
To sum up, Table 3 shows that electoral failure is associated with larger decreases in
the proportion of responsibility land, with larger increases in the share of contract land,
and with a lower incidence of capital expenditure on schools. While these results suggest
that elections are affecting behavior in the expected way, they should be regarded with
some circumspection. First, the statistics for contract land are based on a small number of
villages. Only 13 villages report a change in the stock of contract land in the year prior
to an election. Second, according to the relevant statistical tests, none of the differences in
means enumerated in Table 3 are statistically signiﬁcant at ordinary levels of signiﬁcance.
B. Non-parametric Estimates of Re-election Probabilities
Figure 2 presents the results of non-parametric regressions which show the expected
rate of re-election success conditional on changes in responsibility land. That is, non-
parametric estimates of the re-election functions of Equation 5. The regressions are based
on “kernel" density estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel and half window widths
speciﬁed in the ﬁgure (Yatchew (2003), Ch. 3). These ﬁgures conform with our expecta-
tions. Electoral success increases as leaders increase the share of responsibility land.
While Figure 2 conﬁrms that elections do provide an incentive for leaders to reduce rent
seeking if they want to remain in ofﬁce, it says nothing about the role of election protocol.
In order to investigate the relationship between election protocol and re-election probab-
21Capital investments in local schools are generally funded with village revenues rather than revenue
from the center.
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Figure 3. Kernel estimates showing the probability electoral success conditional on
changes in the share of responsibility land, and on protocol variables. Relaxing
restrictions on proxy voting shifts the re-election function to the right along
the x axis. A reducing government involvement in the nominating process shifts
the re-election function to the left.
ility, Figure 3 presents two ﬁgures. The left ﬁgure shows the results of non-parametric
regressions which predict the expected rate of re-election success conditional on changes
inresponsibilitylandforsubsampleswithandwithoutrestrictionsonproxyvoting. These
ﬁgures show that, at all levels of rent seeking, re-election is less likely in villages with
more restrictions on proxy voting. The right ﬁgure shows the results of non-parametric
regressions which predict the expected rate of re-election success conditional on changes
in responsibility land for subsamples with and without a purely public nominating pro-
cedure. These ﬁgures show that, at all levels of rent seeking, re-election is more likely in
villages with less government involvement in the nomination process.
We also estimated re-election functions like those in Figure 3 for the other two election
protocol variables (not reported). Consistent with our ﬁndings in Table 2 these regressions
did not support the hypotheses that these protocol variables affect re-election probabilit-
ies.
C. Regression Results
We now examine the relationship between electoral success, electoral protocol, and rent
seeking while controlling for other possible sources of variation in the data. Given the
econometric model discussed above, there are two ways to proceed. First, to estimate
Equation 4 to check whether levels of rent seeing vary systematically with election pro-
tocol. Second, to estimate Equation 6 to check whether the probability of electoral success
varies systematically with rent seeking activity or election protocol.
24Our efforts to assess the effects of the cadres’ reported election protocol in Equation 4
failed to ﬁnd any effect of the election protocol variables on rent seeking. One conclusion
consistent with this ﬁnding is that, for whatever reason, election protocols simply do not
matter in rural China.
However, two other explanations are also possible. First, the evolution of democratic
institutions in rural China has been rapid, and substantially driven by decisions made at
higher levels of government (O’Brien and Li(2000)). Given this, it is possible that leaders
often do not know election protocols until after their election year behavior is determined.
In this case, the leaders regard all elections as identical ex ante, and we will observe no
systematic differences in rent seeking as protocol varies.
Second, an estimation of Equation 4 pools leaders who survived the election with those
who did not. Since our theory tells us that leaders who do not survive re-election should
all engage in maximal rent seeking, given a high turnover rate, estimates of the effect of
changes in electoral protocol will be attenuated by this pooling. The natural solution to
this problem is to restrict the sample to leaders who were re-elected. When we duplicated
our estimates of Equation 4, but restricted our sample to those leaders who survived
the election, we continued to ﬁnd that the protocol variables did not affect levels of rent
seeking, with one exception.
If we use the modal villager’s assessment of the nominating process, we ﬁnd that the
coefﬁcient of the nominating process variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in
estimates of Equation 4. That is, villages where the modal villager reports a purely public
nominating experience, on average, experience larger increases in responsibility land than
do villages where the modal villager does not report government involvement in the
nominating procedure. This result is robust to the inclusion of several different sets of
controls, but is not robust to using the leader’s reports about the nominating process.
We now turn our attention to an examination of the effect of rent seeking and election
protocol on the probability of re-election.
a. Simple Model
Table 4 presents the results of Logit regressions to estimate the re-election function of
Equation 5. In these regressions we predict the likelihood of electoral success as a function
of leader age, pre-election rent seeking, and various combinations of observable village
characteristics, xi.
Column 1 includes only leader age and rent seeking. Column 2 also includes provincial
ﬁxed effects. Column 3 includes several additional village-level variables to control for
the effect of unobserved village heterogeneity. More speciﬁcally, to control for the costs
of collective action and coordination costs, we include the number of households in the
25village and the furthest distance between two small groups in the village. To control
for the cost of access to other levels of government or the press we include commuting
time to the township (the next highest administrative level) and the percentage of village
households with phones. Because land may cease to be a factor in elections as it becomes
a less important part of the village economy, we include two variables to control for
differences across villages in the "value" that villagers put on land; farm land per capita in
the village, and the percentage of individuals of working age involved in agriculture.
We argued earlier that the probable endogeneity of the rent seeking variable will cause
us to underestimate the true importance of this variable. In spite of this, the regressions in
Table4showarobustrelationshipbetweenrentseekingbehaviorandre-electionprobabil-
ities. Moreover, these estimates respond in the expected way to the inclusion of additional
control variables: The magnitude and signiﬁcance of the rent seeking variable increases in
magnitude and signiﬁcance as we add control variables.
Column 4 adds an indicator for pre-election capital spending on schools. This variable
has the correct sign, but is not quite statistically signiﬁcant at usual levels. Given the
crudeness of our measure of government spending the low signiﬁcance of this variable
is not too surprising. To provide a ﬁnal check on our ﬁndings, Column 5 includes an
interaction between the land/labor ratio and change in responsibility land. As there is
more land per unit of labor, land becomes less valuable and the importance of changes
in responsibility land for re-election should decrease. This is exactly the result we see in
Column 5. Together with Table 3 and Figure 2, the regressions in Table 4 make a strong
case for the ability of rural Chinese electorates to replace rapacious leaders at election
time.
We now turn our attention to the role of electoral protocol. For comparison purposes,
Column 1 of Table 5 duplicates the regression of Table 4, Column 4. The other columns
of this table duplicate this regression, but add the election protocol variables one at a
time. Consistent with our earlier results, we see that only the coefﬁcient of restrictions
on proxy voting is statistically signiﬁcant and it has the expected sign. As with other
village controls, including the proxy voting or the nominating procedure variable in the
regression leads to a large increases in the coefﬁcient of the rent seeking measure.
We have experimented widely with regressions, like those in Table 5, that include the
protocol variable, e.g., interactions between protocol variables and rent seeking, different
combinations of control variables. The results of these regressions are broadly consistent
with those reported in Table 5. We also experimented with regressions which include
more than one election protocol variable, but due to data limitations these regressions
were uninformative.
26TABLE 4 
RENT-SEEKING AND SURVIVORSHIP – SIMPLE MODEL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
       
Village Leader Age  .00 
(.04)
-.07
(.05)
-.11
(.07)
-.11
(.07)
-.12
(.11)
Chg Resp Land  10.98 
(9.70)
24.54** 
(11.54)
29.21** 
(11.14)
32.55** 
(12.55)
115.83** 
(47.30)
School Inv.  -  -  -  1.22
(.84)
-
Land/Labor*Chg Resp 
Land
- - - -  -78.76 
(48.91)
Village  Controls  N Y Y Y N 
Provincial Dummies  N  Y  Y  Y Y
Log Likelihood  -37.55  -29.64  -25.56  -24.72 -22.19
Number of Obs  55  55  55  53 53
Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. The village controls include number of households; the 
furthest distance between two small groups in the village; the time it takes to get to the township; the 
percentage of households with phones; land per capita; and the percentage of working individuals in the 
village that farm. 3. ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
27TABLE 5 
RENT SEEKING, PROTOCOL AND SURVIVORSHIP --- SIMPLE MODEL 
Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Village Leader Age  -.11
(.07)
-.11*
(.06)
-.11
(.07)
-.21**
(.10)
-.10
(.08)
Chg Resp Land  29.21* 
(17.63)
39.66** 
(14.35)
30.24** 
(11.73)
77.14** 
(38.43)
31.07** 
(14.16)
         
         
Protocol  Variables:         
         
Nomin. Procedure    1.13 
(.81)
    
         
Cand. Public Forum      .45 
(1.98)
         
Proxy voting        -5.12** 
(1.46)
         
Fixed  Ballot  Box       .75 
(1.59)
         
         
Village  Controls  Y  Y Y Y  Y 
Provincial  Dummies  Y  Y Y Y  Y 
Log Likelihood  -25.56  -24.09  -25.49  -11.33  -17.73 
Number of Obs  55  52  53  45  50 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
28b. A Model with Many Types of Leader
The preceding estimates implicitly assume that leaders and electorate play about the same
strategies regardless of the leader’s observable characteristics. There is no a priori basis
to think this is true. Indeed, Besley and Case (1995a) ﬁnd that governors who differ
in their observable party afﬁliation behave in a qualitatively different ways. Thus, we
might expect that old leaders and young leaders will have systematically different tastes
for rent seeking, and that electorates will therefore choose different re-election functions
to play against old and young leaders. In this section we investigate this hypothesis
by incorporating the interaction term Leader age × Change in Responsibility Land into our
earlier regressions.
Table 6 duplicates the ﬁrst four columns of Table 4 with the additional interaction term.
The interaction term causes two noteworthy changes. First, the coefﬁcients of two terms
involvingrentseekingareestimatedsomewhatmoreaccurately. Inmostoftheregressions
we reject the hypothesis that these parameters are zero at the 1% level rather than the 5%
level of Table 4. Second, the sign of the coefﬁcient for rent seeking ﬂips.
In fact, these regressions show that for a leader older than the sample average of 46,
increases in rent seeking are associated with lower rates of re-election, while for leaders
with below the sample average age, higher rent seeking is associated with higher rates of
re-election. Despite the different magnitudes of the coefﬁcient estimates, these statements
are true for each of the four regressions reported in Table 6.
On ﬁrst glance, these results seem odd. However, recalling the differences observed
by Besley and Case (1995a) between Republican and Democratic governors is helpful. In
the results reported in Table 6, the electorate appears to expect old leaders to behave like
"Republicans" and keep rent extraction low. On the other hand, the electorate appears to
expect that young leaders will behave like "Democrats" and extract rent from the village to
be used for public works. The results from Column 4 of Table 6 provide further evidence
for this characterisation: Old leaders get less beneﬁt from school investment than do
young leaders.
To check whether our results about election protocol are robust to the inclusion of the
leader age/rent seeking interaction term, Table 7 duplicates the results of Table 5, with
two changes. First, as in Table 6, we include the interaction of leader age with changes in
responsibility land. Second, to conserve degrees of freedom, we drop the village controls
from all regressions. The results in Table 7 are qualitatively the same as those presented
in Table 5. Only the proxy voting variable has any impact on re-election success.
29TABLE 6 
RENT-SEEKING, PROTOCOL AND SURVIVORSHIP –TWO COHORT MODEL 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Village Leader Age  .09
(.05)
.06
(.06)
.04
(.08)
.10
(.08)
Chg Resp Land  -563.42** 
(274.21) 
-855.51*** 
(292.61) 
-1414.31*** 
(485.44) 
-1675.93*** 
(638.02) 
Age*Chg Resp Land  12.43** 
(6.03)
19.25*** 
(6.41)
31.97*** 
(10.68)
37.77*** 
(14.08)
School Inv.  -  -  -  21.20* 
(12.58)
School Inv.* Age  -  -  -  -.44 
(.27)
Village Controls  N  N  Y  Y
Provincial Dummies  N  Y  Y  Y
Log Likelihood  -32.61  -23.71  -17.06  -15.73
Number of Obs  55  55  55  53
Note: 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. The village controls include number of households; the 
furthest distance between 2 small groups in the village; the time it takes to get to the township; the 
percentage of households with phones; land per capita; and the percentage of working individuals in the 
village that farm.  3. ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
30TABLE 7 
RENT SEEKING, PROTOCOL AND SURVIVORSHIP --- TWO COHORT  MODEL 
Variable (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Village Leader Age  .06
(.06)
.04
(.06)
.07
(.07)
.11
(.08)
.10
(.08)
Chg Resp Land  -855.51** 
(292.61) 
-815.05** 
(298.31) 
-904.56** 
(307.15) 
-2320.05** 
(1032.98) 
-840.17** 
(274.85) 
Age*Chg Resp Land  19.25** 
(6.41)
18.45** 
(6.54)
20.29** 
(6.73)
51.78** 
(23.06)
18.97** 
(6.06)
          
Protocol Variables:           
          
Nomin. Procedure    .76 
(.76)
    
          
Cand. Public Forum      1.00 
(1.08)
          
Proxy voting        -3.49* 
(1.98)
          
Fixed Ballot Box          -.30 
(1.06)
          
          
Village Controls  N  N  N  N  N
Provincial Dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y
Log Likelihood  -23.71  -23.24  -23.31  -14.51  -21.63
Number of Obs  55  54  55  47  52 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%. 
31TABLE 5a 
RENT SEEKING, PROTOCOL AND SURVIVORSHIP --- SIMPLE MODEL 
VILLAGER RESPONSES 
Variable (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Protocol Variables:         
        
Nomin. Procedure  3.37*
(1.97 )
 3.78* 
(1.96)
        
Proxy voting    -2.01
(1.35 )
-2.29** 
(0.96)
        
Fixed Ballot Box       0.66 
(1.78)
        
Log Likelihood  -23.58 -24.84  -18.91  -21.09 
Number of Obs  52  52  51  52 
Notes: In addition to village controls and provincial dummies, each regression also includes the other 
explanatory variables reported in Table 5, Leader Age, and Change in Responsibility.  Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses.  ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.  
32c. The Importance of Errors in Reported Election Protocols
To assess the importance of errors in the cadres’ reported election protocol, we replicated
the estimations of Tables 5 and 7 using the modal villagers’ reports of election protocol
rather than the cadres’ reports. These results, reported Tables 5a and 7a, are very similar to
thoseobtainedusingthecadres’reports.22 However, therearetwonoteworthyexceptions.
First, the coefﬁcients of the modal villager’s report on proxy voting in Column 2 of Table
5a is smaller and slightly less signiﬁcant than its counterpart in Table 5. Similarly for
the corresponding results from Tables 7 and 7a. That is, if we use the modal villager’s
report to measure restrictions on proxy voting we ﬁnd that restrictions on proxy voting is
somewhat less important than when we use the cadre’s report. Second, using the modal
villager’s report on nominating procedure in Column (2) of Table 5 and Column 2 of Table
7 results in larger coefﬁcients that are, respectively, statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% and
1% levels. Thus, using the modal villager’s report to measure nominating procedures we
ﬁnd the nominating procedure is somewhat more important.
We also experimented with a two-stage correction for attenuation bias in our protocol
variables. In particular, we performed a ﬁrst stage OLS regression to predict the cadre’s
reported protocol as a function of the modal villager’s report and village controls. We then
used this predicted protocol in ﬁrst stage regressions corresponding to those reported in
Table 5. This procedure resulted in larger and more signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for changes in
nominating procedure, slightly smaller and less signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for proxy voting,
and continued insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients for the other two protocol variables. In sum,
the two stage regressions are broadly consistent with our other results, but suggest that
attenuation bias is more important for our measures of nominating procedure than for
measures of proxy voting. We note that this accords with the raw data. The degree of
agreement between our two measures of proxy voting is higher than between our two
measures of the nomination procedure.
It remains to check whether proxy voting and nominating procedure have an inde-
pendent effect. According to the villagers’ reports, about one half of villages have one
protocol but not the other, while about one half have both or neither. Thus, it reasonable
to try regressions to separate out the effects of the two variables. Column 3 of Table 5a
includes both proxy voting and nominating procedure, and ﬁnds that they indeed do
have independent effects.23
22Since the Villagers report only four villages with a public forum for candidates, and leaders do not
survive re-election in any of these four, we cannot duplicate our results based on the leader’s reports with
villager reports for this variable. See footnote 19.
23Efforts to duplicate this result using the cadres’ reports were unsuccessful. As is commonly the case
when we include more than one protocol variable, many village election outcomes are perfectly predicted
by such a regression and coefﬁcient estimates are erratic.
33TABLE 7a 
RENT SEEKING, PROTOCOL AND SURVIVORSHIP --- TWO COHORT  MODEL
VILLAGER RESPONSES 
Variable (2) (3) (4) 
Nomin. Procedure  2.202***
(0.83 ) 
      
Proxy voting    -2.11*
(1.15)
      
Fixed Ballot Box      -0.18
(1.65)
      
Log Likelihood  54 54 54 
Number of Obs  -21.17 -22.90 -22.90 
Notes: In addition to village controls and provincial dummies, each regression also includes the 
other explanatory variables reported in Table 7, Leader Age, Change in Responsibility Land, and 
the interaction of Leader Age and Change in Responsibility Land.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***=1%, **=5%, *=10%.  
34D. Importance of Election Protocol
We have presented evidence that electoral success responds to rent seeking behavior, to
restrictions in proxy voting, and to changes in the nominating process. We now assess the
magnitude of these effects.
We ﬁrst evaluate the importance of changes in rent seeking behavior. To do this, for
every village in our sample, we evaluate the Logit distribution twice using estimated
parameter values from Column 4 of Table 5 and actual values of all village characteristics
other than Changes in Responsibility Land. For Changes in Responsibility Land, we
use the actual village realisation plus one half of the standard deviation of this variable,
and also, the actual village realisation minus one half of the standard deviation of this
variable. The difference between these two probabilities is the estimated effect of a one
standard deviation change in rent seeking on electoral success for this village. We
average this difference over all villages and ﬁnd that the estimated average effect of a one
standard deviation increase in rent seeking activity is a 22% decrease in the probability of
re-election.
We next evaluate the effect of changes in the restrictions on proxy voting using the same
method, using the coefﬁcients estimated in Column 4 of Table 5. We ﬁnd that the average
estimated effect of switching a village from less restrictive to more restrictive rules for
proxy voting is a reduction of 38% in the incumbent’s probability of surviving election.
The corresponding calculations for the importance of nominating procedure, based on
Column 2 of Table 5 indicate that switching from to a purely popular nomination process
is associated with a 17% increase in survival rate. In sum, these calculations suggest that
changing nominating procedures or restrictions on proxy voting has about the same effect
on re-election success as does a one standard deviation change in rent seeking activity.
Since these estimates are based on the assumption that leader rent seeking does not
vary as protocol varies, these calculations should be regarded with some caution. With
this caveat in place, however, these estimates suggest that a leader in a village where
looser proxy voting is permitted can engage in about two standard deviations more rent
seeking behavior than in a village where proxy voting is more restricted, and, all else
equal, have the same probability of surviving re-election.
On the one hand, these calculations imply that reforms to elections may have important
effects on the incentives for leaders to engage in rent seeking behavior. On the other
hand, our estimates also show, that if, prior to the most recent elections, all of the villages
switched to the least restrictive proxy voting regime, only 69% of leaders would have
survived the election (as opposed to the observed survival rate of 49%). For the sake of
35comparison, US gubernatorial elections have about a 77% turnover rate.24 Thus, even
elections that operate without restrictions on proxy voting provide a strong disincentive
to rent seeking.
6. Conclusion
The belief that elections reduce rent seeking by government ofﬁcials is widely held, like-
wise the belief that rent seeking decreases as elections are less subject to corruption. In
this paper we develop and test a model in which these beliefs are carefully examined.
We ﬁnd compelling evidence that elections in rural China create a strong incentive for
leaders to act in the interests of the electorate. The plot of re-election success versus rent
seeking presented in Figure 2 shows very clearly that re-election probabilities increase as
leaders act so that a larger share of village land rents remains with villagers. These results
are conﬁrmed by our regression results: Nearly all of the regressions in Tables 4-7 show a
statistically signiﬁcant relationship between rent seeking activity and re-election success.
Given an environment where an elected leader’s authority is (in principle) subject to
usurpation by the un-elected Party Secretary, and where electoral practices are suspicious
at best, this strikes us as important evidence for the robustness of the democratic process
and the usefulness of corruptible elections.
We also ﬁnd strong evidence that restrictions on proxy voting improve the ability of
rural Chinese electorates to oversee their leaders. In Table 2 we see a statistically signi-
ﬁcant difference in re-election rates as proxy voting by non-family members is and is not
allowed. The non-parametric regressions of Figure 3 along with the Logit regressions re-
ported in Tables 5 and 7, all conﬁrm that re-election rates drop in villages with restrictions
on proxy voting. These ﬁndings persist, at slightly lower levels of signiﬁcance if we use
the modal villager’s report rather than the cadre’s report.
We also ﬁnd evidence that a purely public nominating procedure leads to better gov-
ernance in rural China. In Table 2 we see that re-election rates are higher in villages
with purely public nominating procedures than without, but this effect is not statistically
signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed in the regressions reported in Column 2 of Table
5 and Column 2 of Table 7. After controlling for other sources of variation in the data,
the effect of a purely public nominating process on re-election probability is positive but
not signiﬁcant at conventional levels. If we instead use the modal villager’s report, these
ﬁndings persist, but at levels of statistical signiﬁcance above conventional thresholds.
24This estimate is based on numbers provided in Table 1 of Besley and Case (1995b). In calculating re-
election rates, we exclude governors who could not run again because of binding term limits, and those
who decided to run for Congress rather than seek re-election.
36That leaders are more likely to survive re-election in villages with purely public nom-
inating procedures suggests that the dominant effect of open nominating procedures is
to recruit better leaders into ofﬁce, rather than to provide an incentive for incumbents
to work harder to stave off more competent challengers. Corroborating this conclusion,
we ﬁnd that if we use the modal villager’s reports (but not the cadres’ reports), levels of
election year rent seeking are lower in villages with purely public nominating procedures
than without (in the subsample of villages where the incumbent won re-election).
We ﬁnd no evidence that having a ﬁxed ballot box or campaign speeches affect the
ability of a rural Chinese electorate to oversee its leaders.
Our ﬁnding that two of the election protocol variables matter and two do not strikes us
as puzzling. The more so because it conﬂicts with ﬁeld observers’ sense that each of our
protocol variables is important. Why does proxy voting affect election outcomes while a
mobile ballot box does not? Even if proxy voting is a more effective way for leaders to
manipulate elections than are mobile ballot boxes, should we not see that this variable has
a similar, if smaller effect?
While it may be that, in fact, mobile ballot boxes and public forums do have an effect
on the re-election function, but that this effect is simply too small for us to measure,
the theory suggests another possible explanation. The ability of elections to restrict rent
seeking is constrained, not by election protocol, but by the leader’s preferences, so that
some marginal changes in election protocol truly do not affect the equilibrium.
Theseresultsappear tohaveimportantimplications forpolicymakerswishingto create
and reform the institutions of local government in transition economies. First, since it is
elections that matter for restraining rent seeking, and this effect is robust to having poorly
conducted elections, the emphasis for reform should be placed on the pervasiveness
of elections rather than their quality. Second, to the extent that efforts are directed at
electoral reform, restrictions on proxy voting and increases in electorate participation in
the nominating process should be given a high priority. Other details of campaigning and
polling appear less important.
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7. Appendix: Data on Leader Turnover
Figure 1 shows much of what we know about the turnover of leaders. In this ﬁgure, a
triangle indicates the start of a leader’s term. A vertical line up from a triangle indicates
the duration of a leader’s term. An x indicates the year of the most recent election.
The numbers along the ﬁgure’s top border give the number of elections reported by the
interviewed cadre to have occurred in the village since 1988, the (putative) inception of
the organic village law.
The line segment for each leader’s term is labelled with one of ﬁve letters: ”S” indicates
a leader who survived the most recent election. ”W” indicates a winner at the most recent
election. ”L” indicates a loser at the most recent election. ”P” indicates a leader who was
promoted and left ofﬁce to become his village’s party secretary. ”U” indicates a leader
who came to ofﬁce un-elected.
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Figure 4. Triangles indicate the beginning of a term. An "x" indicates the most recent election.
The segment for each leaders term is labelled with one of ﬁve letters: ”S” indicates a leader who
survived the most recent election. ”W” indicates a winner at the most recent election. ”L” indicates
a loser at the most recent election. ”P” indicates a leader who left ofﬁce to become his village’s
party secretary. ”U” indicates a leader who came to ofﬁce without being elected.
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